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THE CONSTITUTION'S CONGRESS
GARY LAWSON*

In order to know whether Congress is (as the title of this panel wonders)1
"the broken branch,"'2 one needs a baseline describing how a normallyfunctioning Congress would look.3 Congress is a creation of the Constitution,
and so the Constitution seems to be the obvious place to look for this baseline:
what sort of people does the Constitution expect to serve in Congress and how
does it expect those people to behave once they arrive?
The first clues come in the opening sentence of Article I: "All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." '4 Contrast this
sentence with the opening provisions of Article II: "The executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America"; 5 and Article III:
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."'6 Not only is Congress divided into two bodies with distinct
constituencies, but unlike the federal executive and judiciary, which are vested
with everything falling within the conceptual categories of "executive Power"
and "judicial Power,"'7 Congress is given only those legislative powers "herein
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to the Abraham and
Lillian Benton Fund for support.
I This Essay builds upon my presentation at the panel "Is Congress 'the Broken
Branch'?" at the Boston University Law Review conference on "The Most Disparaged
Branch: The Role of Congress in the 21st Century."
2 Technically speaking, one ought to query whether Congress is "the broken
department," as the founding generation typically used the word "department" to describe
the federal legislature, executive, and judiciary and used the term "branch" to describe the
two Houses of Congress. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1156 n.6
(1992).
3 I say "normally-functioning" rather than "well-functioning" because I am only making
descriptive, rather than normative, claims. I express no opinion about what an ideal
Congress would look like.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
5 Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
6 Id. at art. II1,§ 1,cl.1.
7 This is a cavalier assertion of what is sometimes called "the Vesting Clause thesis,"
which maintains that the first sentences of Articles II and III grant power to the President
and the federal courts. This thesis is wildly contested, but since I and others have defended
the thesis at great length elsewhere, I will rest for now on the cavalier assertion. See, e.g.,
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granted," meaning it is granted only a subset of the powers that a legislative
body might conceivably have. The Constitution thus seems to begin with some
degree of skepticism about the Congress it had just created.
This impression is strongly reinforced when we come to the Constitution's
lawmaking provisions. Article I, Section 7 describes the mechanism by which
Congress makes laws, and it includes the requirement that virtually any action
calling for the concurrence of both Houses shall "be presented to the President
of the United States,"'8 who has a qualified veto subject to a super-majority
override. None of the other institutions of government faces this kind of direct
interference from another department. Congress can, of course, pass laws
"necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the powers vested in
executive or judicial actors, 9 but those laws must aid rather than hinder the
exercise of those powers, 10 and must be consistent with the Constitution's
separation of powers." I The presidential veto, by contrast, can be exercised for
the express purpose of interfering with congressional business. 12 Moreover,
the Constitution makes the Vice President the President of the Senate and gives
the Vice President a tie-breaking vote in the Senate.' 3 No other federal
institution has an actor from another department so blatantly thrust into its daySteven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses As Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1377, 1389-

400 (1994); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1, 22-43.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring presentment for bills); id. at cl. 3 (requiring

presentment for an "Order, Resolution, or Vote"). On the independent scope of the Orders,
Resolutions, and Votes (ORV) Clause of Article 1, Section 7, see Seth Barrett Tillman, A
Textualist Defense of Article , Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was
Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. Rav. 1265,

1364-67 (2005) (arguing that the ORV Clause requires presentment to the President of any
power delegated by Congress to one of its Houses); see also Gary Lawson, Comment,
Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement for Legislative
Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1373, 1375
(2005) (agreeing with Mr. Tillman's general analysis of the ORV Clause but limiting its

application to legislative subpoenas); Seth Barrett Tillman, Reply, The Domain of
Constitutional Delegations Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 TEX. L.
REv. 1389, 1389 (2005) (sticking to his guns).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
10 To aid rather than hinder is what it means for laws to be "for carrying into Execution"
vested powers. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive,
JurisdictionStripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia,
107 COLUM. L. REv. 1002, 1014 (2007); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress'
Power Regardingthe JudicialBranch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 102-03.
it For an in-depth discussion of the meaning of the "Necessary and Proper" (or
"Sweeping") Clause and its implications for the separation of powers, see Gary Lawson &
Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of FederalPower: A JurisdictionalInterpretation
of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267, 291-314, 333-34 (1993).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
13 See id. § 3, cl. 4.
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to-day operations. 14 As we delve into the Constitution, it appears to be
increasingly suspicious of this "Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." 1 5
Indeed, not only is Congress left without any direct role in executive or
judicial decision-making comparable to the roles given to the President or Vice
President in legislative affairs, but Congress is specifically denied any such
role in the Incompatibility Clause, which provides that "no Person holding any
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office."' 16 Thus, Congress cannot use the Senate's power of

advice and consent under the Appointments Clause 17 or its control over
appropriations 18 to compel the President to appoint members of Congress to
key executive positions, which effectively prevents the emergence of
parliamentary government in the United States.1 9
One might say to the Constitution: "Oh, come on! Do you really think
Congress, which already has a substantial portfolio of legislative power, would
also try to force itself into the executive or judicial departments to boot (or
readily fall prey to presidentially-proffered temptation)? Is this a serious
enough risk to justify an entire clause in a Constitution generally noted for its
brevity? What sort of power-mad scoundrels do you expect to end up serving
in Congress?"
At least part of the answer can be found in the two Salary Clauses: the
President shall receive "a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor
diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected" 20 and
14 The Senate, of course, gets an important role in the appointments process and the
ratification of treaties, id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and Congress controls the architecture of the
executive and judicial departments through the Sweeping Clause, id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 18, but
their involvement in these matters is a full step removed from the Constitution's
interposition of the executive into core legislative affairs.
's Id. at art. I, § 1.
16 Id. § 6, cl. 2.
17 See id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President "shall nominate, and by and

with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" federal officers unless Congress
authorizes the appointment of inferior officers by the President alone, department heads, or

courts).
18 See id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law .... ").
19 By the same token, the Incompatability Clause prevents the President from initiating
efforts to corrupt Congress by offering positions. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 459
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing how the Incompatability
Clause provides important guards against the danger of executive influence upon the
legislative body). For an elegant discussion of the Incompatibility Clause and its impact on
American government, see generally Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person,

One Office: Separationof Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79
(1994).
20 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.

CORNELL

L. REv. 1045
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federal judges shall receive "a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office. '21 Again, one can imagine shouting out to
the Constitution, "Oh, come on! Do you really believe Congress would be so
petty and vindictive as to use its control over appropriations to punish
executive and judicial officials for their decisions? Does this risk warrant not
just one but two provisions in a Constitution noted for its brevity? What sort
of people do you expect to end up serving in Congress?"
At least part of the answer can be found in the Emoluments Clause that
accompanies the Incompatibility Clause. While the Incompatibility Clause
prevents active members of Congress from simultaneously serving in the other
departments,2 2 it does not prevent them from receiving appointments after (or
in lieu of) their congressional service and it does not remove the leverage over
appointments provided by the Senate's Advice and Consent Clause power and
Congress's Appropriations Clause power. To prevent circumvention of the
principles underlying the Incompatibility Clause, the Emoluments Clause thus
declares: "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have
been encreased during such time .... ,,23
We cry once again to the Constitution: "Oh come on! Do you seriously
think Congress would be so venal and corrupt as to create or pump up cushy,
high-salaried offices just so Members of Congress could get appointed to those
offices if the voters ever caught on to just how venal and corrupt they are? Is
this a serious enough concern to warrant a clause in the Constitution? What
sort of people do you expect to end up serving in Congress?"
At least part of the answer can be found in the Second Amendment - the
original Second Amendment that had nothing at all to do with guns. The
Emoluments Clause prevents Congress from creating or increasing the pay of
federal offices and then getting its own members appointed to those offices,24
but it says nothing about congressional pay itself. What is to prevent Congress
from voting itself huge sums of money from the public till? Voters can always
bounce the members in the next election, but for nearly two years the members
can live high off the federal hog. With a big enough payday, the wrath of the
voters (as long as it remains in the voting booth and does not extend to the hen

21 Id. at art. III,§ 1.

See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
24 Or at least it tries to prevent it. Hugo Black, William Saxbe, Abner Mikva, and Hillary
Clinton, among others, are testaments to James Madison's prescience about the likely
effectiveness of "parchment barriers." See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308-09 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Will it be sufficient to mark. . . the boundaries of
these departments... and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit
of power? ... But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly
overrated; and that some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary .... ").
22
23
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house and tar pits) might be worth it. The Bill of Rights sent to the states for
ratification in 1791 accommodated this concern. This Bill of Rights contained
twelve proposed amendments, the second of which read: "No law, varying the
compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take
effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened." 25 This
amendment neatly closed the gap left by the Emoluments Clause for those
worried about congressional greed. The amendment, however, failed to get the
necessary votes for ratification, 26 - possibly because state legislators feared the
consequences back home of putting such a precedent into the Federal
Constitution. 27 Two-hundred-one years later, the original Second Amendment
finally received the necessary ratification votes and now sits in the Constitution
as the Twenty-seventh Amendment. 28 But for the votes of a few states, it
could easily have been today's First Amendment.
In sum, the Constitution is very worried that Congress will be full of powermad, petty, vindictive, venal, greedy, corrupt gasbags who, unless
constitutionally constrained, will abuse their power, punish anyone who tries to
stop them, force themselves into positions in the other departments, create
lucrative offices to which they will get themselves appointed, and vote
themselves largesse from the public till.29
Eighteenth-century Congresses lived up to those "expectations." To be sure,
those bodies were capable (on occasion) of high-minded, sophisticated
constitutional discourse that puts the modern academy, much less modern
Congresses, to shame, 30 but it was also capable of being exactly what the
Constitution feared it to be.
Congress set a grand tone by beginning its fledgling lawmaking career with
a flagrantly unconstitutional enactment. The Constitution requires all federal

25 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

18 (1998).

26 The original First Amendment setting minimum and maximum sizes for the House of

Representatives also failed to get enough votes for ratification. Id. at 16.
27 See id. at 18-19.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
29 A broader look at the Constitution's context, drafting, ratification, and history
provides, if anything, an even starker picture of the late eighteenth-century expectations
regarding Congress. The concern with corruption was so pervasive that it has led one author
to posit that the Constitution contains an "anti-corruption principle" that can and should
serve as an independent interpretative guide in constitutional adjudication. See Zephyr
Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle,94 CORNELL L. REv. 341, 342 (2009). One can
reject (as I do) the interpretative conclusion while still appreciating (as I do) Ms. Teachout's
impressive documentation of the founding generation's obsession with corrupt government.
Id. at 346-72.
30 The debates in the House concerning the removal power, for example, could be the
product of an academic conference. For an elegant account of those elegant debates, see
generally Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1021
(2006).
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and state officials to swear an oath to the Constitution, 31 but it only specifies
the precise form of the oath for the President. 32 Because people in those days
actually took oaths seriously, the First Congress sought to determine what
those oaths would say and how they would be administered. Indeed, the very
first statute enacted by the First Congress (even before the protectionist tariff
that came second) 33 was "An act to regulate the Time and Manner of
administering certain Oaths. '34 Although no clause in the Constitution
specifically empowers Congress to prescribe oaths, it seems clear Congress has
the authority to prescribe oaths for itself and for federal executive and judicial
officials under its enumerated power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."35 Section 3 of the legislation,
however, prescribed the form of oath for state officials. 36 Representative
Elbridge Gerry pointed out that Congress has no power to regulate state oaths;
the Necessary and Proper Clause only lets Congress carry into effect
constitutional powers vested in federal,not state, officials. 37 No less a scholar
than the late David Currie observed that this objection was "a good one, ' 38 and
no reported comment by anyone in 1789 seriously answered it. Representative
Bland weakly responded that "if the State Legislatures were to be left to

31 See U.S. CONST. art. VI,

cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned,

and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers,
both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution .... ").
32 See id. at art. II, § 1, el. 8 ("Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall
take the following Oath or Affirmation: - 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my
Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."').
33 Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24, 24 ("An Act for laying a Duty on Goods, Wares,
and Merchandises imported into the United States.").
34 Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 23, 23.
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Each House of Congress could also prescribe its own
oath under its internal rulemaking power, id. § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings .... ), but that would not justify a statute that purports to cover
both Houses. The Senate's rulemaking power, for example, surely does not authorize it to
prescribe the oath for the House of Representatives. The first statute enacted by the First
Congress cannot be validated by the Rules of Proceedings Clause but only by the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
36 Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, § 3, 1 Stat. at 23-24.
37 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 277-78 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Gerry). State
legislatures are in fact given some power by the Constitution - at the very least the power to
propose and ratify amendments, see U.S. CONST. art. V - but the plain terms of the
Necessary and Proper Clause do not give Congress power to implement those powers.
38 DAVID P. CURRIE,

1801, at 14 (1997).

THE
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arrange and direct this business, they would pass different laws, and the
'39
officers might be bound in different degrees to support the constitution,
which, even if true, is not a response to the lack of congressional power. 40 In a
government of enumerated powers, it does not suffice to point out that it would
be convenient for some institution of government to have a certain power.
Representative Jackson then chimed in:
I believe this House, and the other branch of the Legislature, have the
power, by the constitution, to pass a law, obliging the officers of the State
Governments to take the oath required by the constitution that their States
have adopted, and which has become the supreme law of the land. I
believe the
general opinion of the House inclines to favor this
41
sentiment.
That is the full extent of his reported argument, at least on the constitutionality
of what Congress was proposing. 42 While it is perhaps consistent with the
expectations of Congress reflected in the Constitution that a member of
Congress could regard his beliefs, or the beliefs of his colleagues, as sufficient
to establish a proposition of constitutional law, the premises necessary to
validate such an argument seem implausible. Representative Lawrence
thought that "[o]nly a few words will be necessary to convince gentlemen that
Congress have this power. '43 His few words were that Congress "have power
to make all laws necessary or proper to carry the declarations of the
constitution into effect."'44 Apart from the fact that the correct phrasing is
"necessary and proper," not "necessary or proper, '45 the Necessary and Proper
Clause simply does not give Congress power to carry into execution any and
all of the Constitution's "declarations." It gives Congress power to carry into
execution powers vested in Congress or otherfederal institutions.46 Not every
clause in the Constitution vests power in a federal actor, and therefore not
every clause in the Constitution provides fodder for the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Perhaps I am no gentleman, but I am not convinced. The bottom line:
Congress really has no plausible claim to be able to tell state officials precisely
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Bland).
40 If the different degrees of support expressed by various state officials all met the
minimum requirements of Article VI, then no one should care whether they are different. If
some state oaths fell below the Article VI requirements, those states would be in violation of
the Constitution, and presumably acts of those state officials would be null and void.
41 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 278 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Jackson).
42 To be fair to Representative Jackson, that does not mean that it was the full extent of
his actual argument. The reporting in the Annals of Congress is, to say the least, suspect.
39 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 278

See James H. Hutson, The Creationof the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary

Record, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1, 36 (1986).
43 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 280 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
44Id.
45 U.S. CONST. art. I,
46

Id

§ 8, cl. 18.
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what oath they need to take. This did not seem to bother the First Congress
very much, even when the problem was pointed out to it.
The person who pointed out the constitutional problem was Elbridge Gerry,
who has, of course, attained his own measure of fame in the annals of
legislators. 47 But not even Representative Gerry, or Senators McCain and
Feingold, or even the numerous members of Congress currently (as of late
2008) making noise about reviving the Fairness Doctrine 48 can top the Act of
July 14, 1798, popularly known as the Sedition Act. Section 2 of the statute
provided:
That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or
procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly
and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any
false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the
government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the
United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame
the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said
President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute;
or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good
people of the United States... shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
49
two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years.
If the Constitution could speak in 1798, it surely would have been
disappointed, but probably not surprised.
The Constitution does not expect Congress to be filled with good people. Its
principal strategy for dealing with the likes of Congress is thus to limit the
jurisdiction of the Congress through the doctrine of enumerated powers, which
has the effect of limiting the amount of damage Congress can do. If the
sandbox is small enough, the rowdy children cannot mess up the yard too
badly.
The doctrine of enumerated powers, of course, is long gone: when Congress
can regulate the kinds of plants you can grow on your farm50 or in your kitchen
window, 51 we are as far from the Constitution of 1788 as was Dorothy from
47 Representative Gerry approved a controversial redistricting plan designed to give his

party an advantage in state senatorial elections, which was later mocked as the
"Gerrymander." MARK 0. HATFIELD, SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1789-1993, at 66 (1997).

48 The Fairness Doctrine is a Federal Communications Commission requirement on radio
and television broadcasters which mandates "that discussion of public issues be presented
on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage." Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969). The upshot of the doctrine is to
prescribe government regulation of the content, including (and even especially) the political
speech, appearing on the airwaves.
4' Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596-97.
50 SeeWickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 132-33 (1942).
51 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5, 9 (2005).
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Kansas. And where Congress is concerned, to paraphrase the Amazing SpiderMan, "[w]ith great power comes great irresponsibility. '52 In other words, what
is broken today is not Congress, as Congress performs more or less as the
Constitution contemplated, but instead the constitutional structure surrounding
Congress, which was supposed to contain the damage. Trying to fix Congress
is a fool's errand. Trying to fix the rest of the Constitution may be a fool's
errand as well, but the potential payoff from success is much larger.

52 Cf AMAZING FANTASY No. 15, at 12 (Marvel Comics 1962) ("With great power there
must also come - great responsibility").
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